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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is the second appeal of the district court’s order denying Mr. Brown’s motion
to suppress statements made during two custodial interrogations with Florida police
officers. In 2013, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order denying
Mr. Brown’s motion and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether
Mr. Brown’s statements were voluntary. Following a suppression hearing on remand,
the district court ruled Mr. Brown’s statements were voluntary and thus denied his
motion a second time. Mr. Brown now appeals to this Court, contending his statements
were involuntary based on the totality of the circumstances, especially the implied
threats of adverse consequences to his wife.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Much of the factual and procedural background is provided by the Court of
Appeals’ Opinion in the first appeal of Mr. Brown’s case, State v. Brown, No. 38347, 155
Idaho 423 (Ct. App. 2013). Mr. Brown had been “arrested in Florida on a fugitive
warrant from Idaho” for theft of Les Breaw’s debit card. Id. at 426–27. Breaw was
missing, and Idaho police officers found a body that they suspected was Breaw. Id. at
427. Mr. Brown’s wife, Tyrah Brown (“Tyrah”), was also arrested in Florida. (Tr. Vol. I,1
p.56, Ls.1–5.)

There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the
transcript of the September 5, 2014, and October 7, 2014, hearings on Mr. Brown’s
motion to suppress. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the transcript of the status
conference held on January 24, 2014.
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Mr. Brown and Tyrah were separately interviewed by Florida police officers
regarding the alleged grand theft and Breaw’s disappearance. Brown, 155 Idaho at 427.
Tyrah was interviewed on March 21. (Tr. Vol. I, p.37, Ls.22–24.) Mr. Brown was
interviewed twice—once on March 20 by Florida Detective John Long and an FBI agent
and once on March 22 by only Detective Long. (See generally Tr., p.30, L.13–p.40,
L.14.) In between the two interviews, on March 21, the body was identified as Breaw.
Brown, 155 Idaho at 427.
In these interviews, the Browns made a number of incriminating
statements. When asked about Breaw’s $50,000 escrow check,2 Brown
claimed that the money was owed to him because of services he had
rendered Breaw, but eventually Tyrah confessed to forging Breaw’s name
on the escrow check. Tyrah also confessed to shooting Breaw and hiding
his body. According to Tyrah, she had done it because Breaw had raped
her. When Brown was told that his wife had confessed, he also confessed
to killing Breaw and told officers that Tyrah was not there. According to
Brown, he and Breaw had gone shooting that day, and during the outing
Breaw offered Brown the escrow check so that Brown would forgive
Breaw for Breaw’s sexual misconduct with Tyrah. Breaw continued,
however, to make disparaging remarks about Tyrah, which ultimately
prompted Brown to shoot Breaw. Brown said that he buried Breaw in the
snow and hid the murder weapon nearby. Brown even drew a map to the
gun’s location to persuade officers that Tyrah was not involved. By the
next day, however, Brown’s story had changed. He recanted his story
about killing Breaw and instead told the Florida officers that shooting
Breaw had been an accident. He claimed that Breaw had first shot Brown
in the leg, which then caused Brown to accidentally shoot Breaw in the
head.

Prior to the interviews, law enforcement learned that “an escrow check for $50,000
payable to Breaw had been deposited into a bank account held by Tyrah. Tyrah had
opened the account on January 22, 2007, and deposited the check two days later.
Within a week, all of the $50,000 had been withdrawn from the account.” Brown, 155
Idaho at 427.
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(R., pp.132–33 (quoting Brown, 155 Idaho at 427–28).) Mr. Brown was charged with
first degree murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and grand theft. Brown, 155 Idaho
at 428. (See also R., p.132.)
Mr. Brown “filed a number of motions to suppress evidence, including his
statements made to Florida police officers . . . . These motions were denied.” Brown,
155 Idaho at 428. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Mr. Brown entered an
Alford3 plea to voluntary manslaughter and accessory to grand theft, reserving his right
to appeal “any prior adverse rulings by the district court.” Id. at 428. (See also
R., p.132.) The district court sentenced Mr. Brown to fifteen years, with ten years fixed,
for voluntary manslaughter and five years fixed for accessory to grand theft, to be
served concurrently. Brown, 155 Idaho at 435.
Mr. Brown appealed, primarily challenging the district court’s denial of his
suppression motions. Id. at 428. The Court of Appeals affirmed on all issues, except
Mr. Brown’s motion to suppress his statements made to the Florida police officers. Id. at
426, 429–32, 437. (R., p.132.)
With respect to Mr. Brown’s motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals provided:
Brown next contends that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress incriminating statements to police. The motion
asserted that his confession was involuntary because Brown was “of
unsound mind” at the time of this interrogation by Florida police. On
appeal, Brown contends that the prosecution did not satisfy its burden of
showing that his statements were voluntary.
....
In his motion to suppress, Brown asserted that his statements to
Florida police were involuntary “because he was of unsound mind when
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See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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the statements were made, and he was not competent to make a
statement.”. . . .
At the hearing, Brown did not allege that his statements were
obtained because of police coercion. Instead, he argued only that his
statements were not voluntary because of mental infirmity. The State’s
argument was also primarily focused on this issue. The district court
approached the matter as it was presented by the parties, concluding that
any statements that Brown made to law enforcement agencies were not
rendered involuntary based upon any claim of a mental health deficiency.
On appeal, Brown does not continue to advance his argument
below that the “evidence” he presented shows he was mentally incapable
of voluntarily confessing. Rather, Brown now argues that his suppression
motion should have been granted because the State presented no
evidence whatsoever to meet its burden of proving that his statements
were voluntary.
Brown is correct in asserting that it was the State that bore both the
burden of going forward with evidence and the burden of persuasion on
Brown’s suppression motion. . . . The State presented no evidence about
the circumstances of the interrogations or Brown's mental acuity at the
time. On the other hand, Brown did not even allege that he made his
statements because of coercive police activity, which is a necessary
predicate to a finding that a confession is not “voluntary” within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor
did he offer any evidence that the mental condition for which he was
evaluated in Idaho in August of 2008 had any bearing upon the
voluntariness of his statements made in Florida nearly a year and one-half
earlier. However, determining that Brown presented little or no evidence of
involuntariness does not mean that the State met its affirmative burden to
prove voluntariness. In short, the record is devoid of adequate evidence
from which the trial court could make any finding concerning the
voluntariness or involuntariness of Brown's statements to Florida police.
Brown, 155 Idaho at 429–31. Due to the State’s failure to meet its burden, the Court of
Appeals was “constrained to vacate the order denying Brown’s suppression motion and
remand for a new hearing at which, presumably, the State will present some relevant
evidence bearing upon the voluntariness or involuntariness of Brown's statements to
Florida officers.” Id. at 431–32.
The district court held the new suppression hearing on remand. (See generally
Tr. Vol. I, p.16, L.1–p.80, L.8.) Detective Long testified via two-way video conferencing.
4

(Tr., p.17, L.9–p.57, L.19.) Mr. Brown and licensed psychologist Carl Haugen, Ph.D.,
testified as well. (Tr., p.59, L.11–p.77, L.12.) Video recordings of the interrogation of
Mr. Brown on March 20 and 22 and of Tyrah on March 20 were admitted into evidence.
(Tr., p.30, L.12–p.32, L.6; State’s Ex. 1 (March 20, Mr. Brown); State’s Ex. 2 (March 22,
Mr. Brown); Def.’s Ex. A (March 20, Tyrah).) Mr. Brown and the State submitted posthearing briefs. (R., pp.108–22.)
The district court issued an Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Suppress.
(R., pp.131–36.) The district court first found:
In this case Miranda warnings were given, and Brown was not deprived of
food or sleep. The interrogation by [Detective] Long was thorough, but it
was not unduly long. Long’s approach was low key and made without
threats. Brown appears to be of average intelligence and according to
statements made to the police has operated a successful paralegal
business. Dr. Haugen4 testified that at the time of his examination in 2008,
Mr. Brown was of average intelligence, suffered from depression,
amphetamine dependency, had an anti-social personality, was
manipulative, was protective of others to get power and control, and
significantly, for purposes of this motion, was resistant to being
manipulated by others. These circumstances weigh in favor of the
voluntariness of the statements.
(R., p.134 (footnote omitted).) The district court then turned to Mr. Brown’s primary
argument, that Detective Long coerced him to confess through the threats of adverse
consequences to Tyrah. (R., p.134.) On this point, the district court reasoned: “Tyrah
had already confessed to killing [Breaw]. The threat, express or implied, that she would
be arrested was legitimate and was in good faith. She was arrested and prosecuted.
Even if Brown’s confession was motivated by a desire to protect his wife, the confession

In the original case, Dr. Haugen evaluated Mr. Brown and concluded that he was not
competent to stand trial. (Tr., p.72, Ls.16–21, p.75, Ls.13–15.) After receiving
Dr. Haugen’s evaluation, the district court committed Mr. Brown for ninety days to a
secured medical facility for mental health treatment. Brown, 155 Idaho at 430.

4
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was not involuntary.” (R., p.135.) Thus, the district court determined that the State met
its burden to establish that Mr. Brown’s statements were voluntary. (R., p.135.) The
district court affirmed the sentence previously imposed. (R., p.136.) Mr. Brown filed a
timely notice of appeal from the district court’s Opinion and Order. (R., pp.145–47.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Brown’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
After his arrest, Mr. Brown was interrogated twice by Detective Long regarding

his and his wife’s involvement with Breaw. Mr. Brown confessed to killing Breaw for
raping his wife in the second interrogation. Mr. Brown asserts that his confession was
the product of psychological coercion by Detective Long, who manipulated Mr. Brown’s
immense concern for his wife and any adverse consequences to her due to her
confession to the same crime. Because Mr. Brown’s confession was coerced and thus
involuntary, Mr. Brown contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress his statements.
B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a

motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v.
Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). “The Court accepts the trial court’s
findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234
(2005). “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the
trial court.” Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570. The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
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C.

Mr. Brown’s Statements Were Involuntary Under The Totality Of The
Circumstances, Especially The Implied Threats Of Adverse Consequences To
His Wife
“It is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the

State to use against a criminal defendant a statement that the defendant made
involuntarily.” State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 516 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1985); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514–15
(1963); State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709, 712 (Ct. App. 1998)). “The doctrine disallowing the
use of involuntary confessions . . . applies to any confession that was the product of
police coercion, either physical or psychological, or that was otherwise obtained by
methods offensive to due process.” State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 814–15 (Ct. App.
1997) (citing Miller, 474 U.S. 104 (1985); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985);
Haynes, 373 U.S. at 514–15).
To determine whether a statement was involuntary, “the inquiry is whether the
defendant’s will was overborne by police coercion.” Schumacher, 136 Idaho at 516.
“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not
‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). “Although the ultimate
issue of voluntariness of a confession sought to be suppressed is a legal question, the
trial court’s underlying factual findings as to whether the police intimidated, threatened
or coerced the suspect to make a statement are measured by a totality of the
circumstances test.” State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888, 891–92 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations
omitted). In short, “the proper inquiry is to look to the totality of the circumstances and
then ask whether the defendant’s will was overborne.” State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214
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(1993) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)). If the defendant’s will
was overborne, “the confession cannot be deemed ‘the product of a rational intellect
and a free will.’” Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (quoting Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960)).
“It is true that threats to prosecute a defendant’s loved one when there is no
legitimate basis to do so may be coercive and can render a confession involuntary.”
Schumacher, 136 Idaho at 517. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
psychological coercion brought on by a police officer’s threat of adverse consequences
to a loved one. In Lynumn, for example, the United States Supreme Court held that the
defendant’s confession was “not voluntary, but coerced,” when “the police had told her
that state financial aid for her infant children would be cut off, and her children taken
from her, if she did not ‘cooperate.’” 372 U.S. at 534. Likewise, in Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959), the United States Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s “will
was overborne” based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 321–23. Of particular
significance was law enforcement’s instruction to a police trainee, who was also the
petitioner’s childhood friend, “falsely to state that petitioner’s telephone call had gotten
him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be
disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child.” Id. at 317, 323. See
United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335–37 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding psychological
coercion produced defendant’s confession after police caused the defendant to fear, if
she failed to cooperate, that she would not see her young child for a long time); see also
United States v. Finch, 998 F.2d 349, 355–56 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding the defendant’s
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statements involuntary due the police’s unfounded threats to arrest the defendant’s
mother and female companion).
In State v. Davis, 115 Idaho 462 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals came to
similar conclusion of psychological coercion due to threats of adverse consequences to
a loved one. Id. at 463–66. In that case, the prosecutor informed the defendant that his
mother had been charged and arrested for the same crime due to his refusal to confess
during the initial interview. Id. at 464. The prosecutor told the defendant that “it was
‘time to talk’” and he believed the defendant had not yet confessed in order to protect
his mother. Id. The defendant then confessed to the crime, “but only after an emotional
display in which he pleaded leniency for this mother.” Id. After the defendant confessed,
his mother was released on her own recognizance and her charges were dismissed
during the preliminary hearing for insufficient evidence. Id. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the Court of Appeals held that “the timing and sequence of events
surrounding [the mother’s] incarceration exerted a psychological influence on Davis
sufficient to impede his ability to render a voluntary confession.” Id.
Similar to Davis, Detective Long’s interrogation tactics with Mr. Brown “exerted a
psychological influence” on him “sufficient to impede his ability to render a voluntary
confession.” Id. Mr. Brown and Tyrah were arrested together on March 20, and they
were placed in separate holding cells. (Tr., p.44, L.16–p.46, L.11, p.56, Ls.1–5, p.56,
Ls.14–25, p.64, Ls.4–8.) Mr. Brown was first interrogated the afternoon of March 20.
(Tr., p.46, Ls.12–15.) During the first interrogation, Mr. Brown told Detective Long that
Tyrah had five miscarriages since she and Mr. Brown were married. (State’s Ex. 1,
12:20–12:33.) Mr. Brown explained to Detective Long that, most recently, Tyrah found
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out she was pregnant in late December, but she had another miscarriage in early
March. (State’s Ex. 1, 16:37–17:03.) Throughout the interrogation, Mr. Brown expressed
concern for his wife and a focus on her health and well-being, noting her past struggles
with drug abuse and suicide attempts. (State’s Ex. 1, 18:55–19:59, 24:43–25:00, 31:20–
32:18, 35:13–35:40, 53:00–54:10). The first interview lasted about one hour and forty
minutes. (Tr., p.32, Ls.10–17; see generally State’s Ex. 1.)
On March 21, Detective Long interrogated Tyrah. (Tr., p.49, Ls.1–10.) Tyrah told
Detective Long that she killed Breaw after he raped her. (Tr., p.49, L.20–p.51, L.3.) She
also told Detective Long that she had fought off Breaw’s sexual advances in the past.
(Tr., p.49, L.24–p.50, L.2.) She said that she was by herself when she shot him.
(Tr., p.52, Ls.2–4.) She explained to Detective Long that she hid the body and threw the
gun in a dumpster. (Tr., p.51, Ls.4–6, p.51, L.19–p.52, L.1, p.52, Ls.5–11.) Tyrah also
agreed to and took a polygraph. (Tr., p.52, Ls.12–23.) At the suppression hearing,
however, Detective Long testified that he “wasn’t believing her story” because she could
not tell him the exact location of where she dumped the gun. (Tr., p.53, Ls.15–25.) She
provided him only a vague description. (Tr., p.52, Ls.8–10, p.53, Ls.22–23.)
On March 22, Detective Long interrogated Mr. Brown a second time. Detective
Long wanted Mr. Brown to tell him “what he knew about it” because he was not
“convinced” Tyrah killed Breaw. (Tr., p.53, Ls.15–19.) Throughout the interrogation,
Detective Long manipulated Mr. Brown’s relationship with his wife. Detective Long told
Mr. Brown early on in the interview that Tyrah had told him “everything” about “the
money, the murder, the rape, and that he was involved.” (Tr., p.38, L.25–p.39, L.1, p.54,
Ls.17–19; State’s Ex. 2, 4:10–6:20.) Detective Long told Mr. Brown that he knew
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Mr. Brown found out Breaw had “forced himself” on his wife. (State’s Ex. 2, 5:05–5:10.)
Detective Long justified Mr. Brown’s actions as simply protecting his wife, not as a
“serial killer” or “spree killer.” (State’s Ex. 2, 5:08–5:28.) Detective Long continued with
this narrative, telling Mr. Brown over and over again that his wife was raped and
Mr. Brown acted justifiably by defending her and doing his “husband” duty. (State’s Ex.
2, 5:22–7:27, 13:55–14:00, 14:17–14:39, 17:02–17:08, 23:14–24:00, 26:02–26:09.)
Detective Long highlighted how Tyrah had been abused her whole life and Mr. Brown
was the “only person” that stood up for her. (State’s Ex. 2, 11:52–12:12, 13:26–13:40,
17:02–17:16.) He emphasized how much Tyrah loved Mr. Brown for “always taking care
of her.” (State’s Ex. 2, 5:42–5:53, 13:55–14:00, 20:13–20:50, 42:02–42:08.) Detective
Long asked multiple times Mr. Brown to “set the record straight,” “save himself,” and
“help me help you” because this was a crime of “rage, revenge, anger, heat of passion”
to defend his wife. (State’s Ex. 2, 7:05–7:25, 7:48–8:15, 10:35–11:27, 26:15–26:40.)
Eventually, Mr. Brown provided an emotional confession to the crime, explaining how he
shot Breaw after Breaw bragged to him about raping his wife and tried to buy him off.
(State’s Ex. 2, 34:24–36:00, 39:52–41:36, 48:42–49:44, 51:58–53:40.)
After the confession, Detective Long asked Mr. Brown for more details on how
Tyrah was raped. (State’s Ex. 2, 59:02–59:12.) Mr. Brown told Detective Long that
Tyrah “miscarried because of him.” (State’s Ex. 2, 1:22:44–1:22:57.) Mr. Brown also told
Detective Long that he hoped Tyrah would be okay, Tyrah “didn’t do nothing,” and he
wanted Tyrah to talk to a lawyer because she “had a life ahead of her.” (State’s Ex. 2,
1:24:30–1:24:48, 1:30:20–1:30:40.) This interrogation lasted approximately one hour
and thirty minutes. (See generally State’s Ex. 2.) Mr. Brown submits that the totality of
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the circumstances demonstrate Detective Long took advantage of Mr. Brown’s
vulnerable mental state and his desire to protect his wife after her rape, miscarriage,
and possible criminal charges to obtain his confession.
The facts of the interrogations here are distinguishable from the facts in
Schumacher, which the district court relied on to determine that Mr. Brown’s confession
was voluntary. (R., pp.134–35.) In Schumacher, the Court of Appeals cautioned that “a
suspect’s confession is not involuntary merely because it was motivated by the desire to
prevent a good faith arrest of a loved one.” 136 Idaho at 517. The Court of Appeals held
that the defendant’s confession was voluntary because the agent’s threat to arrest the
defendant’s wife “was not unjustified” due to the possibility of uncovering physical
evidence linking the wife to the crime. Id. The Court of Appeals also noted that the
agent did not suggest that the defendant “could prevent his wife’s arrest by confessing,
so the agent’s comment did not pressure Schumacher to make a statement.” Id.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the agent’s inquiry into the care of the
defendant’s children was “a legitimate point of inquiry” and any risk of adverse
consequences to the children was created by the defendant’s illegal actions. Id.
In contrast to Schumacher, Mr. Brown asserts that Detective Long’s implied
threats of prosecution or harm to Tyrah were unjustified. At the time of the
interrogations, Detective Long did not believe Tyrah’s confession. He testified to as
much as the suppression hearing. (Tr., p.53, Ls.15–25.) Thus, Detective Long’s implied
threats of consequences to Tyrah were unfounded and unsupported at the time. Rather,
Detective Long used Tyrah’s false confession to coerce Mr. Brown to confess to the
same crime. Considering that Detective Long’s interrogation tactics elicited what he
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believed to be a false confession from Tyrah, there is no reason to believe that these
same tactics would not work on Mr. Brown to obtain an involuntary confession.
Mr. Brown submits that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s opinion
and order denying his motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 3rd day of February, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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